This article deploys a politico-sociological historical analysis in the interrogation of the origins, tenacity and resilience of Ndebele particularism across pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs in Zimbabwe. While the issue of Ndebele particularism is currently overshadowed by the recent political and economic crisis that has seen Zimbabwe becoming a pariah state, it has continued to haunt both the project of nationalism that ended up unravelling along the fault-lines of Ndebele-Shona ethnicities and the post-colonial nation-building process that became marred by ethnic tensions and violence of the 1980s. In this article, Ndebele particularism is described at two main levels. Firstly, successive pre-colonial, colonial Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 28 and post-colonial historical processes contributed to the construction and consolidation of Ndebele particularism. Secondly, this particularism is a product of coalescence of grievance and resentment to Shona triumphalism. The politico-sociological historical analysis is intertwined with a social constructivist perspective of understanding complex politics of identities in general. The discussion is taken up to the current reverberation of Ndebele particularistic politics on the internet including the creation of a virtual community known as United Mthwakazi Republic (UMR) that symbolises the desire for a restored pre-colonial Ndebele nation in the mould of Swaziland and Lesotho.
Introduction
Zimbabwe is one entity and shall never be separated into different entities. Your excellence you may be surprised to hear that I usually get lost when I come across people who mix up my country Matabeleland with Zimbabwe, because Zimbabwe is a former British Colony which was colonised in 1890 and granted independence on 18 April 1980. While my homeland Matabeleland is a territory which was an independent Kingdom until it was invaded by the British South Africa Company (BSA Co) on 4 November 1893, in defiance of the authority of Her Majesty Queen Victoria. Actually in terms of the Moffat Treaty of Peace and Unity of 11 February 1888 between Queen Victoria and King Lobengula, Britain and Matabeleland were allies, and due to our respect to our late King we have not renounced his vow.
Working within the auspices of the organisation known as Umhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi dedicated to the restoration of an autonomous Kingdom of Matabeleland, Mabhena has progressed to file a legal case for review of the verdict of the judicial council of the Privy Council on the land case of Matabeleland on the 19 th of July 1918 by the British Government. What is of historical interest here is what is termed 'the thesis of the plight of the people of Matabeleland and its remedy' which outlines the constitutional history within which the people of Matabeleland were colonised and their sovereignty taken away. This is how the case is put forward:
The Respondent is the SOVEREIGN OF THE BRITISH CROWN a colonial power which granted the 'Royal Charter of Incorporation to the BSA Co.' and conferred it with all the powers of a government on all lands north of the Limpopo River. After the conquest of the Kingdom of Matabeleland on 4 th of November 1893 the Respondent did legalise the contraband deal of the BSA Co. pioneers, referred to as the 'Victoria Agreement of 14 August 1893' which was a scheme of displacing the people of Matabeleland and loot their cattle. I also submit that the Respondent went further to legalise the said contraband contract through the proclamation of the Matabeleland Order-in-Council on 19 th of July 1894…The Respondent further ruled through the verdict of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1918 that: 'The Ndebele Sovereignty had been broken up and replaced by a new, better system as defined by the Matabeleland Order-in-Council of 1894'.
After the above judgement had usurped the Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Matabeleland through the said Order which replaced our statehood, the Respondent again through the 1923 Constitution of Southern Rhodesia, did confer the jurisdiction to the white supremacy regimes who were comprised of its descendants, the power of reigning over us through conquest, using the legal bases of the said Order, an act which continued to seriously prejudice our wellbeing for a duration which accrued to a total of 87 years under racial domination.
In 1980 again the Respondent went further to use the said Order as the legal basis of simultaneously decolonising Mashonaland with the status of an independent Republic of Zimbabwe, to which it consequently transferred the mandate of ruling us, in Matabeleland by conquest to black majority supremacy regime comprising of Shona tribe through 'The Constitution Order 1980 (S.I. 1980 of the United Kingdom) made 19 th March 1980.' an act which has perpetuated tribal domination for 27 years bringing the duration of repression in Matabeleland to a total 114 years. 1
This case indicates the current embers in the politics of Ndebele particularism and the current drive for the restoration of an autonomous Ndebele nation separate from Zimbabwe. This article, therefore, interrogates the history behind the origins and resilience of Ndebele particularism -that makes it refuse to be swallowed by current territorial nationalism.
The Ndebele of Zimbabwe are variously described as a tribe, a clan and an ethnic group. But Ndebele novelists and culturalists, including active promoters of Ndebele particularism and advocates of the restoration of the pre-colonial Ndebele kingdom, prefer to use the term nation instead of tribe. 2 The idea of the Ndebele as a distinctive nation inevitably threatens Shona hegemony that became triumphant in 1980 when the Zimbabwe African National -Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the former liberation movement that was dominated by the Shona-speaking people, came to power. As noted in the epigraph above, Robert Mugabe has ruled out as impossible the idea of the realisation of a restored and autonomous Ndebele nation in the mould of Swaziland and Lesotho. But throughout the liberation struggle, Ndebelespeaking people stuck with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Whose support base and military wing were dominated by people from the south-western part of Zimbabwe. 3 Ndebele historians like Pathisa Nyathi prefer to use the term uMthwakazi for the Ndebele nation as it is done by the radical UK-based Mthwakazi People's Congress (MPC). 4 This article starts by engaging with some theoretical and definitional issues including contested interpretations of who qualifies as a Ndebele in context of a society characterised by assimilation and incorporation of people from different ethnic groups into the Ndebele state. This process proceeds right from Mzilikazi Khumalo's (the founder of the Ndebele) migration from Nguniland to his final settlement on the south-western part of the Zimbabwean plateau in the late 1830s. The article engages with the historical processes that continued to reproduce Ndebele particularism right across the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.
Theoretical and interpretive framework
A leading anthropologist, John Comaroff (1997) , provided five theoretical propositions relevant to understand issues of ethnic identities in general. His first proposition was that ethnicity was constructed by specific historical forces which are simultaneously structural and cultural. He posits that ethnicity was never a unitary phenomenon because it described both a set of relations and a mode of consciousness that was ever changing. As a form of consciousness, ethnicity was one among many socially constructed phenomena that included totemism, each of which emerged within particular historical structures. Comaroff 's third proposition was that while totemism emerged with the establishment of symmetrical relations between structurally similar social groupings which may or may not come to be integrated into one political community, ethnicity had its origins in the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy. The fourth proposition was that while ethnicity was the product of a specific historical process, it tended to take on the 'natural' appearance of an autonomous force and a 'principle' capable of determining the course of social life. The final proposition was that ethnicity as an objectified 'principle' of collective consciousness of society, could be perpetuated by factors quite different from those that caused its emergence and could also develop a direct and independent impact on the context in which it arose (Comaroff 1997:69-85) .
These are useful propositions that point to ethnicity as a socio-political constructed phenomenon emphasising that the process of construction is mediated and shaped by specifiable historical factors. Comaroff (1997:83) concludes:
The major problem, in both theoretical and empirical terms, it seems to me, is not to account for the genesis and persistence -or even the transformation -of ethnic consciousness and affiliation. Once ethnicity is understood to exist as a set of human relations, a product of specifiable historical forces and processes rather than a primordial 'given,' those issues become readily understandable.
This argument tallies with Leroy Vail (1989:xi) who stated that: 'If ethnic consciousness was a product of historical experience, then its creation and elaboration would be a proper subject of enquiry for historians.' With specific focus on the Ndebele, Bjorn Lindgren (2004:5-8) attempted to take into account what he termed 'historically formed specificity of ethnicity' and 'internal dynamics of ethnicity' in Matabeleland. He focused on clan names and castes in Matabeleland, arguing that Ndebele speakers use various clan names, origins, and 'castes' in a practice of naming and that these internal processes and 'practices break the category Ndebele into parts' (Lindgren 2004:5 ). Lindgren's interests were on smaller units of analysis like izibongo (surnames/clan names) as another avenue towards a more complex understanding of Ndebele ethnicity (Lindgren 2004 ). Lindgren's intervention ended with him trying to deploy the ephemeral izibongo (clan names/surnames) that need explanation in themselves as a scientific concept that could explain Ndebele identity. Ndebele izibongo are a very complex phenomenon on their own and have a complex history of their own for one to simplistically deploy as a concept to understand identity. For instance, in Matabeleland the isibongo Ndlovu is not signifying a single clan group. There are Ndlovu (Gatsheni) who are Nguni, Ndlovu (Gabula) who are Kalanga, Ndlovu (Mthombeni) who are Nguni and other Ndlovus with various ethnic origins. So one cannot use and take isibongo Ndlovu to mean a single clan and then quickly assign ethnic origin to the concept (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2004) . On top of this there were numerous people of Lozwi-Shona origin who used their own agency to translate their original Shona surnames into Ndlovu. The reality is that one finds numerous Ndlovus in Matabeleland and the Midlands regions sharing a common totem (elephant) but not tracing their descent from common clans or ethnic groups.
Totemic politics need explanation and cannot be deployed casually to enlighten debates on ethnicity in Matabeleland. Lindgren relied heavily on the works of white literate observers and early white writers who simplistically failed to go beyond the totem to the clan name in their definition of who was Ndebele and who was not (Hughes 1956; Child 1969) . Ngwabi Bhebe, a historian, has shown that a number of people of Shona origin who were assimilated into the Ndebele state tended to Ndebele-lise their Shona surnames. Examples included Shiri becoming Tshili, Mhofu becoming Mpofu, Zhou becoming Ndlovu, Hungwe becoming Nyoni (Bhebhe 1979) . Therefore, an approach to understanding Ndebele ethnicity based on izibongo rides roughshod over complex histories and complex processes of social engineering that took place in the Ndebele state. Lindgren ended up reviving the old fashioned idea of the Ndebele nation being divided into castes. This is how he put it (Lindgren 2004:13) :
The isibongo places an individual within one of these categories of origin, and thereby within one of the three categories denoting 'caste': the Zansi, the Enhla and the Lozwi (or Holi).
The discourse of castes just like that of izibongo ignores historical factors and social fluidities within the Ndebele state. For instance, the term Zansi literally meant the South in geographic sense while Enhla literally means the North. It also denotes direction. But Lozwi is a form of ethnic identity of a branch of Shona people who belonged to the Rozvi state that dominated the south-western part of the Zimbabwean plateau prior to the arrival of the Ndebele. This means that at one level people in the Ndebele state were categorised according to where they came from with the abeZansi (those from the South) forming an aristocratic grouping, the abeNhla (those from the North) constituting a second layer of grouping, and those assimilated from the Rozvi state forming the Holi grouping. 5 Terence Ranger (1994b:10) defined identity in Matabeleland at two levels.
The first was what he termed the 'generous' and 'inclusive' and the second was what he described as the 'narrow' and xenophobic. The formation and consolidation of the Ndebele state was predicated on the generous and inclusive assimilationist policy where Ndebele language became a common signifier of identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The Ndebele were active in defining and articulating their identity in positive terms of a strong nation. And their neighbouring Shona communities also engaged in defining the Ndebele as a tribe that only expanded through forcible assimilation of captured Shona people, the majority of whom were given Ndebele-oriented animal totems as surnames. What Ranger termed the narrow and xenophobic conception of Ndebele identity was also promoted by the Shona groups for counter-hegemonic purposes. In this scheme of things, the Ndebele were reduced to Ngunis who were identifiable through such surnames as Khumalo, Mkwananzi, Gumede, Mafu, Gatsheni and Mathema. 6 So far there are many versions of Ndebele identity that have mushroomed in recent years. The most narrow and ill-informed of them all is that one that reduces being Ndebele to being members of the Khumalo clan that constituted itself as the ruling elite under Mzilikazi and Lobengula Khumalo. This is a clannish definition that fails to take into account the complex processes of nation building evolved by Mzilikazi who continually added new groups into the lower echelons of the original Khumalo clan. The second version is one that defined Ndebele-ness linguistically -as comprising any one who spoke Ndebele language as a mother tongue. Then there is the regional-local definition that defines a Ndebele as any person residing in Matabeleland or the Midlands regions of Zimbabwe. This I will call the regional-geographic definition of being Ndebele. To those with a hegemonic Ndebele agenda, being a Ndebele means a conglomeration of all those people whose ancestors were assimilated into the Ndebele state, be they of Nguni, Sotho, Shona, Kalanga, Tonga, Tswana, Venda or Lozwi extraction. This historical-pluralistic-hegemonic definition of being Ndebele celebrates the Ndebele nation as a pre-colonial form of a rainbow nation. The most recent definition was concocted during the post-colonial era and in the midst of violence that engulfed Matabeleland and the Midlands regions of Zimbabwe in the period 1980-1987. During this period being Ndebele was limited to being loyal to Joshua Nkomo and PF-ZAPU, the former liberation movement that became an opposition after 1980 (Sibanda 2005 ). This political definition had the immediate impact of uniting all those who were brutalised by the Fifth Brigade, not only as a dissident community as ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe defined them, but also as a victimised and unwanted community that had to look for a state of their own (Msindo 2004) . This definition took the form of post-colonial re-tribalisation and provincialisation of Ndebele identity that was initiated by the state in the period 1980-1987. Its message was very simple: 'ZAPU is connected with dissidents and ZAPU is Ndebele therefore the Ndebele are dissidents' (Abrams 2006:60) . As put by Enos Nkala, Nkomo was then the modern Ndebele king (BBC 1983) .
Since 1980, the Ndebele identity continued to undergo a continuous process of minoritisation as Shona identity picked the agenda of hegemonic triumphalism. Finex Ndhlovu, a language specialist based in Australia, argued that the notion of ethnic minorities is a highly contested subject that cannot be fully explained in terms of demographic facts alone as it is indexically linked to struggles over socio-political power, cultural domination and control (Ndhlovu 2006:1) . He explored how discursive practices underwriting the hegemony of dominating ethnic groups like the Shona, the use of languages as markers of ethnic and national identity, as well as the appropriation and abuse of the terminology such as 'minority' and 'majority' are deployed in Zimbabwe in pursuit of exclusionary political agendas (Ndhlovu 2006:1) .
One can define the Ndebele as an ethnic group as well as a nation. But Stephen Barbour (2001:7) tried to differentiate an ethnic group from a nation in this way:
Unlike a nation, an ethnic group need not occupy a territory. Also, unlike a nation, its 'common myths and historical memories' may be more plausible; since ethnic groups may be much smaller than modern nations…And, rather than a 'mass, public culture' uniting very disparate elements, there may be high level of shared cultural norms; and there is usually a shared language.
All these complex definitions cannot make sense outside a properly nuanced interrogation of specific historical processes that continued to enact, produce and reproduce Ndebele particularism.
Historical interpretation of the construction of Ndebele Identity
Ndebele particularistic ethnic identity has a pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial origin. Its origins are lodged within the complex nation-building project initiated by King Mzilikazi Khumalo and taken further by his son and successor King Lobengula Khumalo. The Rhodesia settler-colonial state was not an innocent bystander in this process and the Shona-dominated post-colonial Zimbabwean state also shared in this process. 7 What is not in doubt is that Ndebele identity is a product of complex constructivist processes that span pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs. 8 A historically informed, careful and nuanced analysis of the evolution of Ndebele particularism should take into account such concrete historical factors as the Mfecane Revolution and Nguni-Sotho nation building strategies of the 1820s, as well as the role of colonialists and African nationalists in pushing the evolution of the country towards self-determination along bifurcated ethnic lines. Post-independence events like the connection of Shona triumphalism with Gukurahundi atrocities; the limits of the Unity Accord, the death of Joshua Nkomo and the current Zimbabwe crisis with its displacement of many people and the resultant formation of exile-based diasporic communities obsessed with identity politics need to be analysed and factored into the understanding of Ndebele identity politics.
It was the superior art of nation building displayed by Mzilikazi Khumalo that led the historian John D. Omer-Cooper (1966:8) to present the Mfecane as a positive process of political change and a 'revolution in Bantu Africa' . Despite the vigorous revisions of the Mfecane by Julian Cobbing in the 1980s and 1990s, and his attempt to 'jettison' the Mfecane from Southern African History, no one has disputed that this revolution was marked by creative statecraft that led to the emergence of such new political and social formations such as the Ndebele in the highveld of South Africa (Cobbing 1988) . 9 The process unfolded in terms of how a small Khumalo clan expanded into a nation and how a small Khumalo ruling elite managed to broadcast its power over people of different ethnic groups. Mzilikazi employed such strategies as raiding, conquest, assimilation and the incorporation of individuals, groups and communities. It included inculcating Ndebele values and language over people of different ethnic groups (Cobbing 1976) . By the time of Ndebele permanent settlement on the south-western part of the Zimbabwean plateau after 1840, what had started as a small Khumalo clan had snowballed over time into a heterogeneous nation consisting of different groups. On how the Ndebele won a sizeable number of Sotho and Tswana communities into their nascent state, Margaret Kinsman argued that the presence of the Ndebele on the western highveld from 1826 to 1838 introduced a period of ambiguous peace rather than devastation. The Ndebele managed to push out the Griqua, Kora and other brigands that subsisted on raiding the Sotho and the Tswana. This atmosphere attracted some of these communities to join the Ndebele on their own volition. 10 It was the Boer Trekkers, trekking from the Cape Colony in what became known as the Great Trek, who used firearms in their constant attacks on the Ndebele and eventually forced Mzilikazi to migrate to the Zimbabwean plateau (Pretorius & Kruger 1937; Tylden 1953) . On reaching the Zimbabwean plateau, the process of nation building continued in the form of conquest, assimilation and incorporation of Lozwi, Kalanga, Birwa, Tonga, Nyubi, Venda, and Suthu inhabitants of the south-west. It was those people of the south-western part of the Zimbabwe plateau who constituted the third 9 See also extended debates on the Mfecane in Hamilton 1995. (Sithole 1995:130) . The uniting factor was the language known as IsiNdebele.
The best way to understand Ndebele ethnic identity is as a socially constructed phenomenon, not as a fixed primordial identity. It must be understood as the protean outcome of the continuous and generally conflictridden interaction of political, economic and cultural forces both external and internal to developing ethnic communities (Berman 1998:310 11 AbaLozwi were part of the Rozvi state ruled over by the Mambos (rulers). This Rozvi state was found by the Ndebele already tottering and breaking into smaller chieftaincies.
As such the Rozvi people were not able to offer united resistance to the Ndebele invaders from the South. The Ndebele assumed that all the people of the South-west were under Rozvi rule before they came hence they labelled those assimilated into the Ndebele state on the Zimbabwean plateau amaLozwi.
Colonialism, nationalism and Ndebele particularism
The colonialists did not 'invent' Ndebele ethnic identity; they 'reconstructed' it for colonial purposes. By the time of colonial rule, the Ndebele state had existed as a centralised political reality in the south-western part of the Zimbabwean plateau with people who were conscious of being Ndebele and who spoke IsiNdebele as their national language (Cobbing 1976; NdlovuGatsheni 2004 (Cobbing 1977; Beech 1986; Ranger 1967) . The surrender of the Ndebele in 1896 was facilitated through negotiations (Indaba) at Matopos Hills where Cecil John Rhodes made some promises to the Ndebele which included giving them seeds for farming and the return of some originally looted cattle to the Ndebele chiefs (Ranger 1999) . This means that the Ndebele even emerged from the Uprising of 1896 as a cohesive nation. This lasted up until the time of the massive evictions of the Ndebele from areas around Bulawayo to far away areas, which opened the way for white commercial farming in the 1920s and after the Second World War (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007).
Since the colonial conquest, the Ndebele have not given up the dream of re-establishing themselves as a nation with a new king as its head. Terence Ranger, in The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, provides details on how in the period 1898-1930 the Ndebele formed what he described as protest movements that were partly looking towards accommodation with the structures of the colonial states and partly campaigning for a separate homeland (Ranger 1970 This fossilisation, in a settlement previously a Ndebele pre-colonial headquarters, of 'foreign' languages, different ethnicities and modes of behaviour, explains why it took a heavy and protracted struggle for the Ndebele and other inhabitants of Matabeleland to 'regain' Bulawayo.
Throughout the colonial period up to the time of the rise of the mass nationalist movements, the Ndebele had tried very hard to maintain a certain level of particularism. The colonial state reinforced this development of particularism by dividing the country into ethnic names like Matabeleland, Mashonaland and Manicaland. Bruce J. Berman (1998:315) commented on this colonial development in this way:
Each administrative unit ideally contained a single culturally and linguistically homogeneous 'tribe' in which people continued to live within the indigenous institutions and were subject to 'tribal discipline' through local structures of authority. The imperatives of control thus also constrained the transformation of African societies and indeed, made what the colonial state understood to be the local institutions of tribe and kinship into grassroots foundations of colonial domination, as well as a means by which it could derive a degree of legitimacy from association with 'traditional' social forces. 14 Ndebele particularism continued to reverberate within the colonial state to the extent that the Matabele Home Society successfully lobbied and agitated for name-change of Rufaro Township into Njube Township (Roberts 2005) . Rufaro was a Shona name for a township at the centre of Bulawayo. Njube was one of the sons of Lobengula. This change was owing to the urban work of the Matabele Home Society. Roberts concluded that 'the Home Society, the Mzilikazi Family Association, and indeed the Khumalo as traditional leaders outside the colonial order, played their part, holding the people of western Zimbabwe together, as a nation defined by culture rather than as nationalists defined by politics' (Roberts 2005:37) .
Masipula Sithole, who studied Zimbabwean nationalism from the perspective of ethnicity, noted that at the formation of the first mass nationalist organisation, the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) in 1957, the Ndebele-Shona axis emerged, manifesting itself in the words exchanged at the founding congress as well as in the structure established to lead the party. Conscious effort was made to achieve ethnic or regional balance between the Ndebele and the Shona (Sithole 1995:132) . 15 By 1963, a major ethnic rift hit the nationalist politics with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) splitting along ethnic lines into the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) that was Shona dominated and ZAPU that became Ndebele dominated (Nkomo 1984) . 16 Since that time the history of ZAPU and ZANU have become a tale of ethnic politics and tribalism, bringing more division than unity to the Ndebele and the Shona.
The Zimbabwean nationalists carried the burden of trying to balance the ethnic factor in their respective political organisations in a bid to gain national support and in a bid to manage ethnic differences. Within ZANU the burden was how to balance and manage the equally volatile issue of intraShona ethnicities involving Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika and Korekore groups. ZAPU had to balance Ndebele-Kalanga-Shona composition and Muzorewa and Sithole were engaged in similar processes within their respective organisations. Chief Khayisa Ndiweni of Ntabazinduna in Matabeleland even went to the extent of forming the United National Federal Party (UNFP) that advocated for open power sharing 'between the two major communities in the country' (Sithole 1986:79-84 ).
The recent recurrences of Ndebele particularism
The first crisis that hit the post-colonial nation-building project had to do with ethnicity and integration of military forces. A crisis which began in the ranks of the military, involving open exchange of fire between the triumphant and Shona-dominant ZANLA and the Ndebele-dominated ZIPRA in Connemara (Gweru) and Entumbane (Bulawayo), which ignited a reign of state terror in Matabeleland and the Midlands region in the period 1980-1987. The reign of terror that became known as the Gukurahundi campaign was ostensibly meant to seek and destroy some ex-ZIPRA combatants who had defected from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) to embark on a life of dissidence. But as noted by Bhebe the violence was somehow an inevitable consequence of the way nationalism had evolved and how the nationalist armies had been formed. This is how he puts it:
It is not unreasonable for readers to ask how such close allies [as ZANU and ZAPU] could be involved in a civil war that saw many lives being lost in Matabeleland. On the other hand, to us such a question would only show that the reader has not read this book with attention. For the book has shown how factional conflict in Zimbabwe, or among Zimbabweans, is quite close to the surface. It does not matter whether people belong to the same party…The situation is worse when people belong to different political parties. The reader saw how ZAPU and ZANU followers started killing each other when they were dumped together at Mboroma by the Zambian authorities. The ZIPA experiment in Mozambique collapsed for just that same reason. In Libya, ZAPU and ZANU were put in the same training camps and they killed each other. The reason was very simple. These young men and women were trained to hate each other by their leaders, who wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties. Each party had its own Commissariat Department, whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, how the party was different from each other, who the leaders were and how they were different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus, the cadres were brought up to hate (Bhebe 2004a:256) .
The post-colonial period was crucial in the process of furthering Ndebele particularism by the state's use of violence. The ethnically inspired clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA in the Assembly Points, the running away of some ex-ZIPRA combatants back to the bush, the exploitation of the antagonistic situation by apartheid South Africa via Super ZAPU, and the 'discovery' of arms caches in PF-ZAPU owned farms around Bulawayo, gave the Shona-led government a pretext to use state power to crush PF-ZAPU once and for all, demonstrate to the Ndebele who was in power and widen ZANU-PF control into the south-western part of the country. According to Brian Eric Abrams (2006:24), ZANU-PF and the state 'developed a clear message, sharp media campaign and a multi-layered military response to achieve its highly focused political goals.' The violence was in reality an indication of how Ndebele particularism could not easily blend with a Shona imagined nation and Shona triumphalism. This was indicated by the fact that while the policy of national reconciliation (uniting whites and blacks) endured until 2000, the national policy of unity (uniting blacks) collapsed in 1982 and was followed by ferocious civil war.
As Bhebe (2004b:15) had this to say about the roots of this violence:
Moreover, when people discuss our nationalist historiography they want to pour their worst venom on ZANU-PF and even forget the inevitability of our post-colonial civil war. Perhaps what was not inevitable were its excesses. But frankly, considering the way we had built our guerrilla armies, I again doubt whether a ZIPRA dominated army would have fought such a civil war in Mashonaland any different from the way ZANLA dominated Zimbabwe National Army fought the civil war in the Midlands and Matabeleland. I am aware of the destructive and brutal role of the Korean trained Gukurahundi, but are we certain that if we, as ZAPU, had won the elections, we would not have had our friends to train our own military units to destroy or tame former ZANLA forces. Rivalry between ZAPU and ZANU was simply too much and uncontrollable and only those who were on the periphery of our struggle deserve to misunderstand our post-colonial conflicts.
To some extent we accept the notion of the inevitability of a violent postcolonial civil war pitting the former liberation movements and their former armies against each other. But there is need to posit that the inevitability of violence was underwritten by incompatibilities of Ndebele and Shona particularities. The violence was in a way symptomatic of the failure of a smooth blending of major ethnicities into a new national identity called Zimbabwe. The net effect of this was that violence was the only invitation card by which the Ndebele were invited into a Shona-imagined nation. Matabeleland had to be conquered and forced into part of Zimbabwe. That was the essence of the violence of the 1980s. PF-ZAPU, ZIPRA and Joshua Nkomo only happened to be mistaken for symbols of Ndebele particularism. It is within this context that the impact of that violence has to be understood, particularly its role in the re-packaging of post-Gukurahundi politics in Matabeleland. The proclamation of uMhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi has summarised the forms of oppression emanating from Shona triumphalism in this way: Marginalisation of the elected MPs of Matabeleland a.
Instituting the reign of terror in Matabeleland b.
Perpetrating ethnic cleansing against the people of Matabeleland c.
Translocation of the economic resources of Matabeleland to d.
Mashonaland Reserving key jobs for Shona people in Matabeleland e.
Depriving the people of Matabeleland of education opportunities f.
Retarding the cultural identity of the inter-cultural society of g.
Matabeleland 18 This list encapsulates the core reasons for Ndebele resentment of the postcolonial nation, as a Shona nation and post-colonial state serving Shona interests at the expense of Ndebele. The openly ethnic nature of the violence did not help matters as it made the Ndebele to be even more aware of their differences with the Shona. Lindgren (2005:158) noted that 'people in Matabeleland responded by accusing Mugabe, the government and the 'Shona' in general of killing the Ndebele' . Besides the Fifth Brigade atrocities instilling fear in Matabeleland and the Midlands, it heightened the victims' awareness of being Ndebele and a sense of not being part of Zimbabwe. 19 The Unity Accord that was signed between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF on 22 December 1987 was nothing less than a surrender document where the PF-ZAPU politicians threw in the towel and allowed PF-ZAPU to be swallowed by ZANU-PF. 20 The bitterness and the memory of having lost family members, relatives and friends did not go away with the Unity Accord (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003) . The processes of Matabeleland politics are complex. As represented by Umhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi and other discreet groupings, the politics is both anti-colonial and anti-Shona domination. The young generation of political activists in Matabeleland are very sceptical of territorial nationalism as represented by ZANU-PF. The common perception is that ZANU-PF is a tribal party that survives on tribalism. This position was recently put forward by one regular columnist for New Zimbabwe.com (Mabhena 2006) :
ZANU-PF is a party that is founded on splitting Zimbabwe into tribal groupings, i.e. Shona and Ndebele, whereby Shonas must provide national leadership. ZANU-PF, usually referred to as 'The Party,' has always had in their leadership deck Shonas taking up key leadership positions with a lacing of Ndebele apologists making up the leadership elite numbers. The party had to enlist the services of Ndebele apologists to paint a picture of a government of national unity following the inconsequential 'Unity Accord' signed in December 1987. The Ndebele apologists were to behave like gagged guests at this party -'make no key decisions and above all don't raise questions about the development of the other half of the country.
The Matabeleland problem continues to impinge on and to pulsate within national politics and its salience led Khanyisela Moyo (2006) For our part, for our present generation, this Zimbabwe, and any attempts to maintain it in any guise in future as a state that includes uMthwakazi, is as false as it is silly. It is only part of the grand illusion of the whole Zimbabwe project created in 1980…What we have is their Zimbabwe, of Shonas, and a fledging state for uMthwakazi which we have called UMR. (Mthwakazi 2006) These radical separatist politics co-exists with an equally strong drive by some politicians from Matabeleland and the Midlands regions to close ranks with such political organisations as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), to fight for what they term a 'New Zimbabwe' . These politicians still believe in the power of territorial nationalism and they define the problem as an issue of governance rather than ethnicity. Added to this constituency are the old guard ZAPU nationalists who have continued their membership in ZANU-PF despite being pushed to peripheral positions within the party and the government. All this indicates the depth of the complexities of Matabeleland politics and the lack of consensus within the region on the best way forward.
Conclusion
What is beyond doubt is that what I have termed Ndebele particularism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be ignored in the imaginations of a post-crisis Zimbabwe. It is at the root of the problem of how two nations (Shona and Ndebele) with different pre-colonial histories and memories can be invited into one centralised state that masquerades as a state adhering to the Shona worldview. Ndebele particularism does not fit easily into this imagined nation and the state where Ndebele experiences, histories and heroes are subordinated to triumphant and hegemonic Shona history, if not completely ignored. The way the post-colonial state was abused by ZANU-PF in its drive to violently destroy Ndebele particularism set in motion the current Matabeleland politics of alienation, resentment and grievance that are combining to fuel the desire for a restoration of the pre-colonial Ndebele state. There is pervasive fear in Matabeleland that without a state of their own the Ndebele remain in danger of a repetition of Gukurahundi. The Ndebele people have come to realise that states are used as vehicles to suppress unwanted communities and hence their drive for their own state that will cater for their own national interests. 
